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Abstract Several authors have speculated that (1) the pharmaceutical, genetic or
other technological enhancement of human mental capacities could result in the
creation of beings with greater moral status than persons, and (2) the creation of
such beings would harm ordinary, unenhanced humans, perhaps by reducing their
immunity to permissible harm. These claims have been taken to ground moral
objections to the unrestrained pursuit of human enhancement. In recent work, Allen
Buchanan responds to these objections by questioning both (1) and (2). I argue that
Buchanan’s response fails. However, I then outline an alternative response. This
response starts from the thought that, though moral status-increasing human
enhancements might render ordinary, unenhanced humans less immune to permis-
sible harm, they need not worsen the overall distribution of this immunity across
beings. In the course of the argument I explore the relation between mental capacity
and moral status and between moral status and immunity to permissible harm.
Keywords Moral status  Personal identity  Inviolability  Harm  Partiality 
Cognitive enhancement  Moral enhancement  Human enhancement
A typical adult human enjoys a special moral status. This status is often thought to
confer certain basic rights or claims—for example, to self-determination and
freedom from some forms of non-consensual interference. I will use the term
‘persons’ to refer to the class of beings with the moral status (or one of the moral
statuses) characteristic of currently typical adult humans.
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Many believe that our nearest primate relatives fail to qualify as persons; their moral
status is lower than ours. This difference is often attributed to their lesser mental
capacity. Perhaps it is due to their lacking rationality, practical rationality, or the
capacity for moral agency. But if chimpanzees and other primates possess lower moral
status than persons in virtue of their lesser mental capacity, we might speculate that
beings with greater mental capacity than us would possess a higher moral status than
persons—a supra-personal moral status. This possibility has long been a topic of
theological speculation.1 More recently it has been attributed practical significance in
one of the liveliest debates in contemporary philosophical bioethics: it has been taken to
ground an objection to the enhancement of certain human capacities.
1 The objection
Some drugs have been shown to enhance aspects of mental functioning in healthy
individuals (de Jongh et al. 2008). To date, the demonstrated effects have been
small. But further advances in neuropharmacology, brain–machine interface
technologies and genetics may, in the future, enable the creation of beings whose
mental capacity substantially exceeds our own, perhaps to a degree similar to that by
which our capacity exceeds that of our nearest primate relatives. This has led some
authors to speculate that
(1) The technological enhancement of human mental capacities could result in the
creation of beings with supra-personal moral status (‘supra-persons’).2
Arguably, mere persons could be permissibly harmed for the sake of these supra-
persons in ways that they may not be permissibly harmed for the sake of one another.
For example, perhaps persons could permissibly be used, without their consent, in
medical experiments designed to aid supra-persons. Or perhaps persons could be
rightly excluded from the democratic institutions of the supra-persons. This raises the
concern that
(2) The creation of supra-persons would harm ordinary, unenhanced humans.
Propositions (1) and (2) have been taken to support a range of moral reservations
about human enhancements—interventions that augment the capacities of normal,
healthy humans. These reservations have not been clearly specified, but in each case
the initial thought seems to be that, at the very least
(3) We (existing human persons) have moral reasons not to encourage certain
human enhancements: those that would create supra-persons.3
1 For example, in attempting to explain the origin of human suffering, the English writer and politician
Soame Jenyns (1758, pp. 49–51) speculated that there existed ‘‘angels or demigods’’ with higher moral status
than persons who could therefore rightly harm mere persons. For a satirical response, see Johnson (1825).
2 The ‘could’ in this claim is to be read as denoting physical, not merely logical, possibility. The claim is
that it is physically possible that technological enhancements will produce supra-persons.
3 Moral reasons (henceforth sometimes merely ‘reasons’) are to be understood as pro tanto moral
reasons: reasons with some, but not necessarily decisive, normative force. From (3), a range of further
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Some protagonists in the ethical debate about human enhancement appear to have
been moved by this line of thinking—from (1) and (2) to (3). In a critique of
transhumanism, the movement most strongly committed to human enhancement,
Fukuyama (2004, p. 42) writes that
Underlying [the] idea of the equality of rights is the belief that we all possess a
human essence that dwarfs manifest differences in skin color, beauty, and
even intelligence. This essence, and the view that individuals therefore have
inherent value, is at the heart of political liberalism. But modifying that
essence is the core of the transhumanist project. If we start transforming
ourselves into something superior, what rights will these enhanced creatures
claim, and what rights will they possess when compared to those left behind?
And elsewhere (2002, pp. 9–10),
The ultimate question raised by biotechnology is, What will happen… once
we are able to, in effect, breed some people with saddles on their backs, and
others with boots and spurs?
One of Fukuyama’s worries is that enhanced beings might claim greater rights than
are enjoyed by unenhanced humans. But another concern is that enhanced beings
would actually have greater rights than the unenhanced. This could be true if they
possessed supra-personal moral status, as (1) maintains they might.4
Even writers who are unpersuaded by most objections to human enhancement
have taken the objection captured by (1)–(3) seriously. Allen Buchanan, Jeff
McMahan and Julian Savulescu have all found it worthy of prolonged discussion,5
and Buchanan (2011, p. 21) lists it among the eight most important concerns about
the enhancement of human capacities. Buchanan’s work provides the most sustained
critique of the objection. In a recent article and book, he provides a rich and wide-
ranging response to both (1), the suggestion that human enhancement might produce
supra-persons, and (2), the claim that this would harm ordinary humans (Buchanan
2009, 2011). Though he does not claim to have decisively rebutted either
proposition, he does cast considerable doubt on both. For example, he argues that
‘‘The idea of a moral status higher than that of persons is dubious, given a plausible
understanding of the notion of moral status’’ and that ‘‘Even if we grant the dubious
Footnote 3 continued
conclusions might be inferred. It might be argued, for example, that, all things considered, we have most
moral reason not to encourage enhancements that would create supra-persons, that we have most reason
to take steps to prevent the development of technologies that would enable such enhancements, that our
governments have most reason to ban the provision or use of such technologies, or at least that we and our
governments may permissibly do these things.
4 Others have worried that enhancement might render human rights obsolete. See, for example, Parens
(1995). This concern could also be interpreted as an oblique expression of (1)–(3). Human rights could be
rendered obsolete because they are eclipsed by broader or stronger rights that the enhanced beings have in
virtue of their greater moral status.
5 See Buchanan (2009, esp. pp. 346–369, 2011), McMahan (2009a, pp. 600–604), and Savulescu (2009).
Some have also considered the possibility that mentally enhanced beings might have greater moral or
legal rights than unenhanced ones, but not necessarily due to having greater moral status. See Buchanan
(2009, pp. 371–381) and Wikler (2009).
Human enhancement 475
123
assumption that the emergence of beings with a moral status higher than that of
persons is possible, the emergence of [supra-persons] would not extinguish
whatever rights the unenhanced have by virtue of being persons’’ (2009,
pp. 349–350).
I will argue that (1) and (2) are in fact quite resilient—more resilient than
Buchanan recognizes. Though we certainly lack conclusive evidence for their truth,
we are not in a position to rule it out. We should remain open to the possibility that
human enhancement could create supra-persons, and thereby harm ordinary,
unenhanced humans. However, it is, I will argue, not clear that proponents of human
enhancement need be troubled by this possibility, for there is an alternative way of
responding to the objection captured by (1)–(3).
2 Preliminaries
Before embarking on my argument proper, I need to introduce some assumptions.
First, some assumptions about moral status. The concept of moral status is most
commonly deployed in attempts to explain or justify the attribution of certain basic
moral protections, such as basic moral rights or claims, to certain beings. For
example, it may be said that human fetuses or non-human primates have a right not
to be killed because they have the same moral status as ordinary adult humans.
These attempts usually appeal, ultimately, to the non-moral properties of the beings
in question, for example, their mental capacities, potential mental capacities, or
species membership. The concept of moral status simply serves as a way of picking
out those non-moral properties. To say that a being has a certain moral status is, on
this view, roughly to say that it has whatever intrinsic non-moral properties give rise
to certain basic moral protections.
In accordance with this way of thinking about moral status, I will assume that
Assumption I Other things being equal, a being with higher moral status will
enjoy stronger and/or broader basic rights or claims than a being of lesser moral
status.
Beyond this, I wish to remain as open as possible to competing views about the
relationship between moral status and moral rights and claims. However, I will need
to assume that
Assumption II Two beings of the same moral status may enjoy different rights
and claims.
This assumption is shared by those mentioned above who have discussed the
objection that I address in this article. It is also consistent with common sense,
which allows, for example, that two beings with the same moral status may have
different rights or claims because of their different internal or external circum-
stances. For example, a more severely injured person may have a stronger claim to
medical assistance than a less severely injured one even though they share the same
moral status. Or one mildly injured person may have a stronger claim to medical
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assistance than a moral equal because her medical assistance can be provided at
lower cost.
In addition to these assumptions about moral status, I also need to make some
assumptions about the manner and circumstances in which beings of supra-personal
moral status would be created, if they were to be created at all. I assume that supra-
persons would be created through the enhancement of pre-existing human persons,
not de novo (for example, by constructing sophisticated computers) nor via the
enhancement of other beings (such as non-human animals or human embryos, if
these do not qualify as persons). I also assume that these enhancements would not
be heritable (the offspring of supra-persons would, in the absence of further
enhancements, be mere persons), and that they would be undergone voluntarily.
3 The possibility of creating supra-persons
With these assumptions in hand, we can now turn to the objection under
consideration. This begins from the claims that
(1) The technological enhancement of human mental capacities could result in the
creation of supra-persons
and
(2) The creation of supra-persons would harm ordinary, unenhanced humans.
In the next two sections I will assess (1) and (2) in the light of Buchanan’s critique
of them. In the subsequent sections, I offer and defend my own response to the
objection.
First, then, claim (1). Buchanan doubts though does not outright deny (1); he
doubts that beings created through the enhancement of humans could have supra-
personal moral status. The view on which he leans most heavily in raising these
doubts is the view that
(Threshold) There is a threshold of mental capacity above which all beings
have the same moral status and above which currently typical adult humans lie
(Buchanan 2009, pp. 247, 357, 366–367).6
This view, which Buchanan takes to be familiar from the Kantian ethical tradition,
is consistent with each of the possibilities schematically depicted in Fig. 1. We are
to imagine that moral status is depicted on the vertical axis, while mental capacity,
or some particular aspect of it, is depicted on the horizontal axis.7
6 See also Savulescu (2009, pp. 237–238), Wikler (2009, p. 346), McMahan (2009a, pp. 601–602),
Wilson (2007), Williams (2008, p. 148). I use the term ‘mental capacity’ rather than Buchanan’s favoured
‘cognitive capacity’ in recognition of the fact that some regard noncognitive mental capacities as
determinants of moral status.
7 Depicting moral status and mental capacity as continuous variables in this way is not without problems,
but I hope that the graphs convey the general idea of Threshold.
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In the first graph, there are a number of thresholds of capacity such that, as one
crosses each threshold, moral status rises discontinuously, whereas elsewhere it is
constant. In the second graph, moral status rises gradually until it reaches some
threshold of capacity beyond which it remains constant. Finally, in the third graph,
moral status is a binary variable.8 In each case, there is some level of capacity below
that possessed by typical adult humans, and beyond which moral status no longer
rises.
Buchanan contrasts Threshold with another view, according to which
(No Threshold) Moral status is a strictly and continuously rising function of
mental capacity, or some particular mental capacity (such as the capacity for
wellbeing).
Each of the possibilities depicted in (Fig. 2) is consistent with No Threshold.
If Threshold is correct, then enhanced beings could not have greater moral status
than ordinary humans: there simply exists no higher moral stratum. Threshold thus
provides a sturdy bulwark against (1). On the other hand, No Threshold does not
rule out the creation of supra-persons; it is consistent with (1).
Fig. 2 Some possible relations between mental capacity and moral status according to No Threshold
Fig. 1 Some possible relations between mental capacity and moral status according to Threshold
8 For discussion of these and other views about how moral status varies across different types of beings
with lower moral status than persons, see DeGrazia (2008) and McMahan (2008).
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Buchanan argues that we should prefer Threshold to No Threshold and
tentatively infers that human enhancement could not create supra-persons. He cites
two main advantages of Threshold. First, it is easily able to accommodate the widely
held intuition that all existing humans who qualify as persons have the same moral
status, whatever their mental capacity (2009, pp. 347–348, 359). For example, the
most intelligent humans have no greater moral status than those whose cognitive
capacities are relatively meager. Threshold can account for this moral equality
among human persons; it allows us to accept ‘‘equality of moral status of the sort we
associate with personhood’’ despite the fact that, among persons, there are ‘‘many
inequalities, including inequalities in the very capacities that confer moral status’’
(2009, p. 359). It is doubtful whether No Threshold can do the same.
Threshold can also accommodate another widely held intuition: that the moral
status enjoyed by persons is special (2009, pp. 360–362). According to Threshold,
the moral status enjoyed by persons may be substantially greater than that enjoyed
by beings with lesser mental capacity; there may be a sharp drop-off in moral status
below the threshold. On No Threshold, on the other hand, persons simply occupy a
point or range on a continuum.
However, even if Threshold is superior to No Threshold, it will not follow that
that human enhancement could not create supra-persons. Buchanan claims that
unless one adopts No Threshold ‘‘the worry that biomedical enhancements for some
but not all would create a new moral status of [supra-person] is highly dubious’’, or,
as he later puts it, ‘‘very implausible’’ (2009, pp. 368–369). His thought appears to
be that rejecting No Threshold forces us into the arms of Threshold. But there are
other possible relations between mental capacity and moral status, including some
that are both plausible and consistent with the possibility of creating supra-persons.
Consider, for example, the view that
(Plateau) There is a range of mental capacity within which all beings have the
same moral status, and within which all currently typical adult humans lie, but
above which moral status rises, either gradually or in steps.9
This view is consistent with each of the possibilities depicted in Fig. 3.
Plateau can plainly accommodate the moral equality of all human persons: we
may all lie on the ‘plateau’. It can also accommodate the view that the moral status
enjoyed by persons is special in the sense that it is substantially greater than that
enjoyed by less mentally able beings. But it allows that enhanced beings could have
greater moral status than persons. Unlike persons, these enhanced beings might lie
beyond the right-hand edge of the plateau.
It might be objected that Plateau lacks the theoretical underpinnings that can be
adduced in support of Threshold. Threshold is consistent with what Buchanan calls
respect-based accounts of moral status, those familiar from the Kantian ethical
tradition.10 These accounts, as understood by Buchanan, have three important
features. First, they hold that there is some mental capacity that confers a special
9 A similar view has also been entertained by McMahan (2009a, pp. 601–602).
10 See, for example, Buchanan (2009, pp. 357, 360–361), Rawls (1971, esp. pp. 504–512), Korsgaard
(1986, esp. p. 93), and Darwall (2006). For discussion, see, Arneson (1999, pp. 118–122).
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moral status, and that is possessed by currently typical adult humans. This may be,
for example, the capacity for practical reasoning, for moral agency, or for engaging
in practices of mutual accountability. Second, they hold that the degree to which
one possesses that capacity is unimportant to moral status; it matters only that one
possesses the relevant capacity to some non-zero degree (which is what I will
henceforth mean when I say that a being possesses a capacity without further
specifying its degree of capacity). Third, as Buchanan interprets them, respect-based
accounts include the assumption that there is no higher capacity, not possessed by
currently typical adult humans, that could confer higher moral status. It follows
from these three features that typical adult humans have maximal moral status, as do
any other beings which possess the relevant capacity. Possession of that capacity
constitutes a threshold beyond which moral status no longer rises.
Respect-based accounts of moral status thus support Threshold. I am aware of no
popular competing account of moral status that supports Plateau. However, it is
easy to imagine a variant of the respect-based account that would support it.
Consider an account according to which two mental capacities, F and G, are all that
matter for moral status. A being with both of these capacities has full moral status.
A being with only one has lesser moral status, and a being with neither has none.
There are thus three discrete tiers of moral status. Suppose further that Capacity F is
possessed by no non-human animals but by all currently typical adult humans.
Perhaps F is the capacity for engaging in practices of mutual accountability, for
practical reasoning, or for moral agency. Capacity G is possessed by no currently
existing humans or animals: it is a higher capacity—perhaps the capacity for higher
forms of co-operation or normative deliberation or moral agency. A being that
possessed both F and G would, on this view, have greater moral status than ordinary
humans, who possess only F.
As far as I am aware, no philosopher has systematically defended a three (or
more) tiered account of moral status in which humans occupy any other than the
highest tier.11 But this has little evidential significance. After all, philosophical work
Fig. 3 Two possible relations between mental capacity and moral status according to Plateau (The
dotted line to the left of the lower threshold denotes that, like Threshold, Plateau is silent on the relation
between mental capacity and moral status in this region.)
11 Though Jeff McMahan has expressed openness to such a view by defending multi-tiered views of
moral status while acknowledging the possibility of a tier higher than that occupied by persons. See
especially McMahan (2008, pp. 93–104).
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on moral status has typically been motivated by a desire to explain the elevated or
equal moral status of humans, and, in some cases, to accommodate the common
sense view that some animals also have significant moral status. If these are one’s
goals, there is no need to consider, indeed no point in considering, higher capacities
that no animals or humans actually possess. The absence of such accounts from the
literature thus provides little or no evidence for their falsity. There is, moreover,
reason to consider such multi-tiered accounts as serious alternatives to respect-based
accounts. There is reason to be suspicious of the presupposition, made by respect-
based accounts, that capacities lacked by typical adult humans are irrelevant to
moral status; it would be a surprising good fortune for humanity if the threshold for
maximal moral status lay just below the level of mental capacity typical of ordinary
adult humans.
Buchanan might reply, at this point, that existing respect-based accounts have
not, as I suggest above, been developed in order to explain the moral status of
humans and non-human animals. Rather, these accounts have fallen out of
systematic moral theories, of a broadly Kantian nature, that are plausible (partly) for
independent reasons. I cannot engage in an appraisal of Kantian moral theory here. I
hope it suffices to note, first, that there is reasonable disagreement about whether
Kantian theories are indeed plausible, and second, that multi-tiered accounts of
moral status of the sort that would support Plateau might in fact be quite consistent
with the most attractive elements in those theories. For example, these multi-tiered
accounts are not obviously inconsistent with the ideas that morality requires acting
on universalizable maxims, that rational agents ought to be treated as ends in
themselves, and that the moral law is created by rational agents.
Alternatively, Buchanan might reply that it is difficult to call to mind any
capacity that could plausibly confer supra-personal moral status. It is difficult to
think of a mental capacity, lacked by ordinary humans but potentially possessed by
enhanced beings, that could fill the role of Capacity G in the three tiered account
that I sketched above. According to respect-based accounts of moral status, persons
have greater moral status than lower beings not because they possess the same
capacities to a greater degree, but because they possess entirely new capacities.
They are not just better at performing the mental tasks that lower beings perform;
they can do entirely different things, such as engaging in moral reasoning. Perhaps
enhanced beings would, likewise, need to possess a new and qualitatively different
mental capacity in order to enjoy supra-personal moral status. As Buchanan notes, it
is not clear what that capacity could be (2009, pp. 359, 362–363).
However, we should not infer from the fact that it is difficult to call to mind such
a capacity that none could exist. We may, as Buchanan admits, simply be faced with
a ‘‘failure of imagination’’ (2009, p. 359). If not for the fact that some people
already possess them, it would be difficult to call to mind many capacities that
enhanced beings clearly could possess. I doubt that I would speculate that enhanced
beings might possess a capacity to perform mental manipulations on objects in more
than four dimensions, or to correctly identify lone musical notes, were I not aware
that some people already possess this ability.
In any case, it may be easier than it seems at first sight to imagine capacities that
would plausibly confer supra-personal moral status. Jeff McMahan has argued that
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substantial enhancements of a number of different mental capacities might result in
the emergence of qualitatively new capacities in much the same way that typically
human capacities such as reasoning and sophisticated language abilities emerged as
Homo sapiens evolved from great apes, which lacked those capacities. He
speculatively considers, as an example of such an emergent capacity, that enhanced
beings might acquire novel means of experiencing the mental states of others:
It is widely held that empathy is relevant to, and perhaps even necessary for,
moral agency, and many philosophers have held that the capacity for moral
agency is necessary for the higher form of moral status. Suppose, then, that
supra-persons would have a capacity that would be better for moral agency
than mere empathy. Suppose they could actually experience other individuals’
mental states while simultaneously reflecting on those experiences in a self-
conscious manner from their own point of view. This would require a divided
form of consciousness, but that would be only a rather extreme instance of the
fragmentation of consciousness of which we are increasingly aware in
ourselves (McMahan 2009a, p. 604).12
It is perhaps plausible to think that beings with this new capacity would possess a
higher form of moral agency than ordinary humans, and that this would endow them
with a higher level of moral status.
I have a further suggestion, and one that may tax our imaginative abilities less
than McMahan’s. Perhaps supra-personal moral status would be conferred by the
capacity for constructive participation in some new form of social co-operation. It is
not inconceivable that quantitative increases in capacities for altruism, self-control
and general intelligence might lead enhanced beings to develop new and
qualitatively different forms of social co-operation. For example, these beings
might replace existing political and legal institutions with an anarchic system in
which individuals are assumed sufficiently altruistic and intelligent to avoid
behaviors that contribute to collective action problems. Or they might replace
existing economic markets with ones in which prices are determined by an
assessment of a fair price by the buyer. Plausibly, we unenhanced humans are
incapable of constructive participation in such forms of co-operation, but enhanced
beings might differ from us in this regard. Quantitative increases in certain mental
(including moral) capacities might confer the entirely new capacity for constructive
participation in such co-operative activities. Moreover, it is conceivable that this
new capacity would confer supra-personal moral status. After all, the inability of
12 A recent case of conjoined twins adds credibility to McMahan’s suggestion. Krista and Tatiana Hogan,
born in 2006, are joined at their heads and their thalami are thought to be connected by a neural pathway.
One of the functions of the thalamus is to relay and process sensory information, and the connection in
these twins appears to allow one to recognize some of the sensory inputs of the other. In one experiment, a
strobe light flashed in Tatiana’s eyes elicited a marked electrical response in Krista’s occipital cortex, the
brain area responsible for processing visual inputs. The parents also report that one twin will laugh at
television images which only the other is viewing. On occasion, the twins also appear capable to
responding to the non-sensory mental states of one another, such as thirst, without verbal communication.
If these twins can genuinely experience each other’s mental states in virtue of their neural connection, one
might speculate that it will, in the future, be possible to engineer similar capacities by creating an artificial
pathway. For a recent discussion of this case, see Dominus (2011).
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non-human animals to constructively participate in characteristically human forms
of co-operation (democracy, economic markets, the operation of legal systems and
so on) is one of the more plausible (or less implausible) grounds for assigning those
animals sub-personal moral status.
Of course, even if neither this suggestion nor McMahan’s is plausible, it remains
possible that there is some mental capacity that we cannot, due to our own lesser
capacity, currently imagine, but that would confer supra-personal moral status. Our
inability to call such a capacity to mind would not rule out the possibility that one
could exist.
4 The harm of creating supra-persons
In addition to questioning the suggestion that human enhancement might produce
supra-persons, Buchanan also questions (2), the claim that the creation of supra-
persons would harm ordinary, unenhanced humans. In assessing this claim I will
assume, as Buchanan does, that some mere persons would still exist following the
creation of supra-persons (not all would make the transition to supra-personhood),
and that the supra-persons would live among and interact with these mere persons.
An obvious reason for denying (2) is that moral status is not zero-sum: one
being’s gain in moral status does not necessitate a loss for any other. So even if
enhanced humans acquired supra-personal moral status, ordinary humans would
retain their existing moral status—that associated with personhood. However, as
Buchanan notes, even if one’s moral status would not be diminished by the presence
of beings with greater moral status, the value of that moral status for the individual
might be diminished (2009, pp. 349, 363–364). One explanation for why moral
status might be devalued in this way is that it is a partly positional good: its value
depends in part on one’s relative, rather than absolute, endowment of it. Consider
the following scenario.13 Suppose, as is somewhat plausible, that it is morally
permissible for a person to kill one non-human primate if and only if this will
(a) prevent the death of three or more primates of equal moral status, or (b) prevent
the death of one or more primates of greater moral status. Now imagine a
population of ten primates all with the same moral status. Each can be permissibly
sacrificed (that is, intentionally killed) to prevent the death of three or more others,
but none can be permissibly sacrificed to avert the death or one or two others. But
now suppose five of the primates acquire a higher moral status through cognitive
enhancement. Although the unenhanced primates have the same moral status as
before, they are now more susceptible to permissible sacrifice. Whereas before, they
could be sacrificed only to prevent the death of three or more others, they may now,
pursuant to (b), be sacrificed merely to avert the death of one or two of their
enhanced contemporaries. The moral status of the unenhanced primates has
diminished in value. Previously, in addition to any other value that it may have had,
their moral status had the instrumental value of conferring a high degree of
13 The example is modified from Buchanan (2009, pp. 363–364).
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immunity to permissible sacrifice. Now it confers less immunity.14 The unenhanced
primates have thus, plausibly, been harmed.
One could, perhaps, deny that the loss of immunity to permissible sacrifice
suffered by the unenhanced primates in this case constitutes a harm. After all, the
loss may make no difference to how their lives go. Arguably, what matters is
actually avoiding sacrifice (permissible or otherwise), not being immune to it. Still,
being rendered less immune to permissible sacrifice can reasonably be expected to
increase the likelihood that one will indeed be sacrificed. Thus, it constitutes at least
an expected harm, and expected harms might be thought to qualify as harms
themselves, or at least to be morally equivalent to harms.
In any case, Buchanan appears to accept that non-human animals might be
harmed through losing immunity to permissible sacrifice (2009, p. 364). What he
resists is the suggestion that persons—such as ordinary, unenhanced humans—
could be harmed in this way. This resistance is based on the thought that being a
person makes one inviolable, and that our inviolability protects us against
permissible sacrifice of the sort that befalls the unenhanced primates.
McMahan (2009a, pp. 601–602) has noted a difficulty with this response to (2): our
inviolability, as persons, does not protect us against all permissible sacrifice. To say that
persons are inviolable is to say that they have certain rights—for example, a right not to
be intentionally killed, a right to determine what is done to one’s body and so on. But
these rights are not, most would agree, absolute and unexceptionable. They may be
overridden in, or may fail to extend to, extreme situations. Even if I am inviolable and
therefore have a right not to be intentionally killed, it may be permissible to intentionally
kill me in extreme circumstances, say, when the only alternative involves the death of
many more people. It might also be permissible to intentionally kill me when the only
alternative involves the death of a being more inviolable than me. Thus, even if persons
are inviolable, they might be rendered more susceptible to permissible sacrifice by the
creation of beings with greater inviolability.
Buchanan responds to this worry by claiming that
… inviolability, properly understood, is a threshold concept…. meeting the
requirements for being a person confers inviolability and that is what counts;
having the characteristics that confer personhood to a higher degree does not
confer greater inviolability. Hence, whatever exceptions there are to the assertion
that persons may not be sacrificed for the sake of other persons apply equally to all
who qualify as persons, mere persons and [supra-persons] included.15
The thought here is that persons are not merely inviolable, they are as inviolable as
supra-persons. Thus, we could not be permissibly sacrificed for the sake of supra-
persons by reason of our lower inviolability.
14 In saying that the unenhanced primates now have less immunity to permissible sacrifice, I do not mean
that they may now be sacrificed for the sake of less important goals; I mean that they may be sacrificed in
a wider range of circumstances. The reason that they can be sacrificed in a wider range of circumstances
is precisely that some goals for which they previously could not be permissibly sacrificed—the saving of
certain other primates—have increased in importance.
15 Buchanan (2009, p. 364). For further elucidation and defence, see pp. 364–367. Though Buchanan
subscribes to this claim, he does not claim to have conclusively proven it. See esp. p. 366.
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There is a further problem, however. There are cases in which one being might be
permissibly sacrificed for the sake of another even though both are inviolable, and
equally so. Consider a case in which you face a choice between killing A and killing B,
where A and B are fully and equally inviolable but A has a much stronger interest in
survival, say, because B is about to die anyway. (Suppose that if you do not kill one of
them, both, along with many others, will be killed by someone else.) Plausibly, it would
be permissible to kill B but not A in this scenario. The reason: considerations of
inviolability are tied, and in such circumstances, interest in survival serves as a tie-
breaker. Though our maximal inviolability protects us against being permissibly
sacrificed for others by reason of our lesser inviolability, it does not protect us against
being permissibly sacrificed when we have weaker claims to continued survival for other
reasons—for example, because we have weaker interests in continued survival—and
considerations of inviolability are tied. This is significant because it seems possible that
supra-persons might, in general, have stronger claims to continued survival than mere
persons. They might have stronger interests in continued survival than us. Or their
interests might matter more than ours. Either way, their existence might render mere
persons more susceptible to permissible sacrifice in tie-breaker cases.
In addition, there are varieties of permissible harm other than sacrifice (i.e.,
intentional killing) against which our maximal inviolability provides no protection
at all. Even if I, as a person, am inviolable, and maximally so, it would be
permissible for a charitable or public hospital to deprive me of headache cure in
order to instead cure some other person with a worse or more easily curable
headache. This is because my claim to the cure derives not from my inviolability,
but from my interest in being free from headaches, and, as it happens, my
competitor has a stronger interest of the same sort. Supra-persons, one might think,
could have exceptionally strong claims to having even mild headaches cured
(perhaps because they have exceptionally strong interests in receiving such cures,
perhaps because their interests count more). Thus, if supra-persons existed, it might
be permissible to deprive me of a headache cure in order to cure a much milder
headache endured by a supra-person. That I am inviolable, or as inviolable as the
supra-person, is neither here nor there in this context.
The more general point is that there are kinds of permissible harm not involving
intentional killing against which our inviolability confers no protection. It thus does
nothing to prevent the creation of supra-persons from reducing what immunity we
do have to these harms. And this reduction in immunity to permissible harm might
itself count as a harm—a kind of meta-harm.
5 The morality of creating supra-persons
It is difficult to confidently reject either (1), the claim that the technological
enhancement of human mental capacities might create supra-persons, or (2), the
claim that the creation of supra-persons would harm ordinary humans. These claims
may be false, but we have discovered nothing that clearly demonstrates this.
Suppose that (1) and (2) are in fact true. Unrestrained pursuit of enhancement
might then, through the creation of supra-persons, harm ordinary humans. Plausibly,
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we have moral reasons not to bring about this harm. Thus, it appears we have moral
reasons not to encourage at least some human enhancements: those that would result
in the creation of supra-persons (henceforth, ‘status enhancements’). This is
precisely what (3) maintains.
It is true that the harm to unenhanced individuals caused by others undergoing
status enhancements is quite different from the sort of harm usually considered by
moral philosophers. It is a second order harm: the harm of having one’s immunity to
other permissible harm reduced. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that we typically
have reason not to bring about second order harms, just as we typically have reasons
not to bring about first order harms, particularly since being rendered less immune
to permissible harm will typically increase the likelihood that one suffers a first
order harm.
So I think that (1) and (2) may be correct, and that they provide some support to
(3). However, I doubt that this should concern the proponent of human
enhancement. In the remainder of this section, I outline why.
First, reasons not to impose the second order harm of reduced immunity to
permissible harm (henceforth sometimes just ‘immunity’) are not always decisive.
Suppose, as is plausible, that emergency medical staff have stronger moral claims
than others to the avoidance of certain harms. Perhaps they have stronger claims to
exemption from jury duty and to the waiving of charges for vaccination services.
Imagine a society in which there are no emergency medics. A politician then
decides to train and employ some. In doing so, that politician reduces the immunity
of those who do not become emergency medics to certain permissible harms. If a
situation arises in which Arnold or Bridget must do jury duty, it is more likely to be
permissible to impose the harm on Arnold now that Bridget has become an
emergency medic than it would have been had she not. However, it is not clear that
the harms imposed on those who remain non-medics count decisively against the
politician’s measure. Perhaps she had some reason not to train emergency medics
because of the reduction in immunity that this would cause to others (I am unsure
about this), but it is certainly not an invariably decisive reason. It might be
outweighed by countervailing reasons—for example, reasons to improve healthcare
provision.
The case just described is most naturally understood as one in which the
politician reduces the immunity of some to permissible harm not by increasing the
moral status of others, but by changing their circumstances. However, similar
thoughts may apply to cases in which one reduces the immunity of some by bringing
it about that others become supra-persons, for example, by encouraging status
enhancements. The consequent reduction in the immunity of the unenhanced
humans may generate some moral reason not to encourage status enhancements,
but, as in the case of training emergency medics, this reason need not be decisive.
For example, it might be outweighed by countervailing reasons to encourage such
enhancements, say, because doing so would increase overall human productivity or
accelerate the rate of scientific progress.16
16 For discussion of the potential social benefits of human enhancement, see, for example, Buchanan
(2008), Bostrom and Roache (2011); Vedder and Klaming (2010).
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In fact, we might have good moral reasons to encourage status enhancements
even if doing so would have no economic or scientific benefits. This is because, just
as the status enhancements would reduce the immunity of, and thereby harm,
unenhanced humans, so too they would increase the immunity of, and thereby
benefit, those who make the transition from personhood to supra-personhood. The
loss of immunity endured by the unenhanced humans would be matched by a gain in
immunity enjoyed by those who undergo the enhancements. Thus, though we may
have some reason not to encourage status enhancements, because of the reduction in
the immunity this would impose on the unenhanced individuals, we may also have a
precisely parallel reason to do so.
What we are faced with here is a possible redistribution of immunity. Status
enhancements would not result in any net decrease in immunity, at a population
level. Immunity would simply be redistributed from those who remain mere persons
to those who become supra-persons. The important question is whether we have
most moral reason not to encourage status enhancements given the redistribution of
immunity that would result.
In what follows, I assess four attempts to demonstrate that we indeed have most
reason not to encourage status enhancements.
5.1 Inequality of immunity
Status enhancements by some but not others would introduce new inequalities in
immunity to permissible harm across different beings. In particular, they would
introduce inequalities between unenhanced humans and the enhanced individuals.
Thus, one way of objecting to such enhancements would be to maintain that there is
value in equality of immunity across beings. If this were so, then status
enhancements would in one way worsen the overall pattern of distribution of
immunity, and it might follow that we have most reason not to encourage these
enhancements.
It is doubtful that there is any value in equality of immunity, however. Indeed,
one cannot maintain that inequality of immunity exists without that inequality
being, in a sense, appropriate or justified. For immunity is a normative notion. One
being has greater immunity to permissible harm than another just in case it enjoys
stronger moral claims against certain kinds of harm, and that cannot be so if the
difference in the strength of those claims is unjustified.
Thus, most believe that there is currently a grossly unequal distribution of
immunity across different kinds of beings such that humans typically possess much
more immunity than pigs, which possess much more immunity than chickens, which
possess much more immunity than scallops. If these differences in immunity indeed
exist, this must be because there are further differences, for example in moral status
or morally relevant circumstances, that justify them. We may have difficulty
spelling out these further differences,17 but if we are to maintain that there is
inequality in immunity, the differences must be there somewhere. If, say, there is no
17 For detailed discussion of some of these difficulties, see Singer (1990), McMahan (1996, 2002,
pp. 204–232, 2008), Arneson (1999), and Vallentyne (2005).
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morally relevant difference between a human and a chicken, then the human is not
more immune to permissible harm than the chicken after all.
Similarly, if status enhancements give rise to further inequalities in immunity,
those new inequalities must also be, in a sense, justified. They are justified by the
very differences in moral status which produce them. Since immunity to permissible
harm is a normative notion, one being cannot have greater immunity than another
unless the difference is justified. So a new difference in moral status could not give
rise to a new inequality in immunity unless it also justified it.
By analogy, suppose that differences in culpability between persons give rise to
differences in their moral liability to punishment. Then if there is a difference in
culpability between two persons, there will be an inequality in their liability to
punishment. But this inequality arises from a difference in culpability which also
justifies it.
Now suppose that two individuals are initially equally culpable, but one then
does some wrongful act which makes him more culpable than the other. A new
inequality in liability to punishment will have been produced. But, as with existing
inequalities, that inequality will be justified, and for the same reason. The difference
in culpability which produces it also justifies it. There has been a change in the
distribution of liability, and it is a change in the direction of greater inequality. But
in a sense this change is not an adverse one, since the inequality in liability maps on
to (and is indeed produced by) a difference in culpability that justifies it. Similar
thoughts apply, I believe, to inequalities in immunity to permissible harm generated
by status enhancements.
Admittedly, there is perhaps a derivative sense in which the inequality in
immunity created by some persons undergoing status enhancements could be
disvaluable even though it would map on to differences in moral status that justify it.
It could be disvaluable if the distribution of mental capacities that grounds moral
status, and thus immunity, were itself disvaluable.18 Suppose that the technologies
enabling status enhancement are monopolized by a group of scientists who ensure
that all members of a certain racial or socio-economic group are prevented from
accessing these technologies. As a result, though many others would like to, only
members of the privileged group(s) actually undergo status enhancements. In this
case, it seems plausible that we wind up with an unjust distribution of mental
capacity across different beings. It seems unjust that some possess greater mental
18 Similarly, it might be argued that existing inequality in mental capacity across animals (including
humans) of different species is disvaluable. Vallentyne (2005) tentatively argues that egalitarian concerns
could require enhancement of the mental capacities of non-human animals. McMahan (1996) takes the
same possibility seriously. The suggestion that existing cross-species inequality in mental capacity is
disvaluable would be most plausible if some non-human animals qualify as persons. These animals would
then, along with human persons, fall straightforwardly within the sphere of egalitarian justice, which
might well deem the unequal distribution of mental capacity across persons to be unjust. It might seem
less clear that inequality in mental capacity could be disvaluable if no non-human animals are persons;
the sub-personal moral status of non-human animals may seem to disqualify them from the sphere of
egalitarian justice. But egalitarian justice may extend to cover beings of somewhat lower moral status
than persons. Moreover, the distribution of mental status across beings might be disvaluable for reasons
other than that it is unjust. Thus, even if one supposes that all non-human animals are sub-persons, the
distribution of mental capacity across existing animals might be disvaluable. So, derivatively, might the
resulting distributions of moral status and immunity to permissible harm.
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capacities than others as a result of this discriminatory policy. Perhaps this injustice
in the distribution of mental capacity across beings would infect the resulting
distributions of moral status and immunity.
It is, however, doubtful whether status enhancements by some, but not others,
would inevitably lead to an unjust or otherwise disvaluable distribution of mental
capacity across beings. Suppose, for example, that access to status enhancements is
decided via a lottery procedure to which all agree in advance. Now, it seems
doubtful whether the resulting distribution of mental capacity would be unjust or
otherwise disvaluable. Or suppose status enhancements were made readily available
to all, but that only some chose to use them, with others preferring to remain mere
persons. Again, it seems doubtful whether resulting differences in mental capacity
would be disvaluable. So it is difficult to see how the resulting distribution of moral
status, and thus immunity, could be criticized.19
5.2 Partiality
I have acknowledged that we may have some reason not to encourage status
enhancements: doing so would reduce the immunity of those who remain
unenhanced. But if we have that reason, we plausibly also have a parallel reason
to encourage these enhancements: doing so would increase the immunity of those
who undergo the enhancement. There would in fact be no net change in total
immunity, only a redistribution of it.
In the previous subsection, I considered the possibility that one might
nevertheless argue against status enhancements by maintaining that they would
lead to a worse overall pattern of distribution of immunity. I took an impartial point
of view, evaluating the distributive pattern of immunity that would exist in the post-
enhancement world—that is, the world in which some persons had become supra-
persons. Perhaps this was the wrong approach, however, and perhaps deviating from
it would open up new possibilities for opposing status enhancements.
An alternative approach would focus not on the pattern of distribution of
immunity that would result from status enhancements, but on the losses and gains in
immunity that these enhancements would impose or confer on individuals. This
approach would open up further means of objecting to status enhancements.
Although the loss of immunity endured by those who remain mere persons would in
a sense be matched by the gains in immunity accruing to those who become supra-
persons, it could be argued that we should care more about the losses than the gains.
One way of defending greater concern for the losses than the gains would appeal
to the idea that we should be partial towards those who suffer the losses of
immunity—we should attach greater weight to the losses of immunity than to the
19 Note also that, if the reason for thinking that greater inequality in immunity would be disvaluable is
simply that the inequality of mental capacity on which it is based is disvaluable, then we are no longer
dealing with a distinctively moral status-based concern about human enhancement. The basic concern is
now simply that enhancement by some but not others would result in disvaluable inequalities in mental
capacity. The implications of this inequality for moral status and immunity to permissible harm may
exacerbate the concern—we may care more about inequalities in mental capacity if we know that they
will also generate inequalities in moral status and immunity—but the problem would be there regardless.
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gains of immunity because we should care more about ordinary, unenhanced human
persons (henceforth, ‘the unenhanced’) than about the enhanced supra-persons
(henceforth, ‘the enhanced’). It is certainly natural to empathize more with the
unenhanced than the enhanced: the unenhanced are more like us. Perhaps it could
also be argued that we should care more about the unenhanced, rather as it is
sometimes argued that parents should care more about their own children than
others, and that citizens should care more about their compatriots than others.
This approach seems unpromising, however. An initial problem is that, at the
time when a status enhancement would take place—which is also the time at which
the gains and losses of immunity would occur—all are unenhanced. There are, at
that point, no enhanced individuals to be partial against.20 Thus, even if we have
reason to be partial towards the enhanced, and against the unenhanced, those
reasons do not yet apply at the time that a status enhancement occurs.
It might be responded that in deciding whether to encourage status enhance-
ments, one could nevertheless be partial against the enhanced, though in a non-
standard kind of way. One could be partial in the sense that one cared less about
gains and losses of immunity when those who received those gains and losses
would, after receiving them, be enhanced individuals. This would, however, be an
unappealing kind of partiality. It would be akin to the partiality that a doctor would
exhibit if she cared less about the effect of an intervention on her patient A than
about the effect of another intervention on her patient B on the basis that patient
A would no longer be her patient following the intervention, whereas B would
remain her patient. Intuitively, the fact that A is a patient of the doctor at the time the
intervention is performed is enough to for her to fall within the scope of any
partiality that doctors have reason to show towards their own patients.
In any case, even if we accept that this non-standard kind of partiality could be
supported by moral reasons, it is difficult to see any reason why it would be so
supported in the present case. It is difficult to see why the kinds of relations that hold
between us and future unenhanced humans could support partiality, of either a
standard or non-standard variety, towards them. We clearly have no relationship
with these individuals of the sort that parents have with their children or doctors
have with their patients. Certain significant relations do obtain between us and the
unenhanced. For example, we existing humans stand in the relation of species co-
membership with future unenhanced humans. However, it is highly controversial
whether species co-membership can ground moral reasons (or even moral
permissions) to be partial. Moreover, the enhanced beings—the supra-persons—
might also be humans: it is not clear that even dramatic enhancements of mental
capacity would have to be species-altering. Thus, even if humans should have
greater concern for one another than for others, this may not give us grounds to care
more about the unenhanced than the enhanced.
It could be argued that merely bearing the relation of moral equality to another
being—sharing one’s moral status with it—is enough to give one reason to be
partial to that being. On this view, persons should be partial to other persons, and
supra-persons to other supra-persons. It is perhaps somewhat more plausible that the
20 I thank Jeff McMahan for raising and pressing me to address this issue.
490 T. Douglas
123
relation of moral equality could generate reasons to be partial than it is that sharing
one’s species membership generates similar reasons. Moral equality is, after all,
morally significant in a way that species co-membership is not. However, it remains
obscure why the relation of moral equality should be attached similar significance to
being in a parent–child or doctor–patient relationship. The relation of sharing moral
status involves none of the interaction, mutual expectation or recognition of a
special connection that characterize those relationships.
In addition, the view that we should have greater concern for those who share our
moral status has some unappealing implications. For example, it implies that in
addition to our reasons to treat animals less well than ordinary humans, since they
have lower moral status, we have a further reason to treat them less well: they have
different moral status and therefore fall outside of the scope of our reasons to be
partial. This is at least mildly counter-intuitive. Intuitively, if it is indeed
permissible to treat animals less well than humans, it is their lower moral status,
not their different moral status, that does all the normative work.
5.3 Harms versus benefits
A more promising way of arguing that we should attach greater weight to the losses
of immunity caused by status enhancements than to the corresponding gains would
appeal not to partiality, but to the claim that we have, quite generally, stronger
reasons not to contribute to harms—normally understood as losses—than to
contribute to benefits—normally understood as gains. This view is often said to be a
part of common sense morality (McMahan 2009b). It can be formulated, in a
general way, as follows: for any agent A, amount of harm/benefit x, and means of
contributing to harm/benefit y, A has greater reason not to contribute in manner y to
x-amount of harm than to contribute in manner y to x-amount of benefit. If this view
is correct, then we have stronger reasons not to reduce the immunity of the
unenhanced by pursuing status enhancements than we have to increase the
immunity of the enhanced to the same degree, and in the same way. This suggests
that, overall, we will have most reason not to bring about the package of losses and
gains in immunity that status enhancements would impose.
A problem, however, is that, according to common sense morality, we have some
reason to contribute to benefits, though it may be weaker than the reason not to
contribute to comparable harms. Moreover, if a benefit exceeds a harm by a wide
margin, the reason to contribute to the benefit will, in many cases, be stronger than
the reason not to contribute to the harm. Reasons not to contribute to harm are not
often of invariably over-riding importance. This suggests that we could have
sufficient reason to encourage status enhancements if they would cause a loss in
immunity to the unenhanced, a comparable gain in immunity to those who undergo
the enhancements, and further benefits. It is plausible that enhancements that
increased moral status would indeed confer benefits besides the gain in immunity
that accrues to the enhanced. For example, they might cause substantial increases in
productivity that benefit almost everyone (Buchanan 2008). So it remains unclear
whether concerns about the immunity of the unenhanced would always, or even
often, give us decisive reasons against encouraging status enhancements.
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Admittedly, there is one sort of case in which reasons not to contribute to harm
cannot, or cannot in any normal circumstances, be outweighed by countervailing
reasons to contribute to benefit: where contributing to the harm would constitute a
rights violation. Thus, if it could be shown that encouraging status enhancements
would violate the rights of those who remain unenhanced, then we could confidently
conclude that there is most reason not to encourage such enhancements.
Do the unenhanced have a right to their immunity that would be violated by
encouraging status enhancements? One reason to doubt that they do is that there are
cases in which our reasons against contributing to losses of immunity are not,
intuitively, decisive. Recall the case of the politician who decides to train and
employ emergency medics, thereby reducing the immunity of others to the
permissible imposition of jury duty or vaccination charges. If there were a general
right to retain one’s immunity and a corresponding duty not to contribute to losses
of immunity, the politician would surely have decisive reasons not to do this.
Of course, we may have more limited rights, such as rights not to have our
immunity reduced in such-and-such a way, or to such-and-such degree, that would
invariably be violated by encouraging status enhancements though they are not
violated, for instance, by training emergency medics. I see no good reason for
supposing that we have such rights, however. I cannot think of any cases eliciting
intuitive responses that favor their existence, nor can I see any good theoretical
grounding for them. It thus seems safest to conclude that encouraging status
enhancements need violate no right to preservation of immunity. If this is correct,
then, though we may have somewhat stronger reasons not to contribute to losses of
immunity than to contribute to comparable gains, that reason might be outweighed
where the creation of supra-persons would also confer other benefits as, plausibly, it
often would.
5.4 Identity change
I have been describing status enhancements as transformations in which fixed
individuals make the transition from personhood to supra-personhood. One final
attempt to show that we have most reason not to encourage status enhancements
would question the accuracy of this description. It would appeal to the thought that
any human enhancement capable of creating a supra-person would be identity
altering. The supra-person would not be the same individual as the person who
existed prior to the enhancement. If this is right, then no individual gains immunity
as a result of the status enhancement. Rather, a being with less moral status, and thus
immunity, is simply replaced by another being with more moral status and
immunity. It may be that the supra-person created by the enhancement enjoys a
benefit in a noncomparative sense: arguably his high level of immunity could be
good for him though he has received no gain. There is also a comparative benefit (or
gain) from the ‘eye of the universe’, since one individual with less immunity is
replaced by another with more. But no individual is benefitted in the straightforward
sense of gaining immunity. On the other hand, there are individuals who are harmed
in the straightforward sense of losing immunity. Those persons who remain
unenhanced undergo no change in identity; they remain the same people, though
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they lose immunity as a result of the enhancement undergone by others. In addition,
the person who undergoes the enhancement would typically be harmed by going out
of existence, though this is, we are assuming, a voluntarily accepted harm. The
enhancement is similar to—or perhaps just is—suicide for that person.
If status enhancements are identity altering, then the overall package of harms
and benefits that a status enhancement produces is as follows. (1) There are harms,
in the form of losses of immunity, suffered by those who remain unenhanced. (2)
There is typically a harm, through going out of existence, for the person who
undergoes the enhancement. On the other hand, there is no straightforward benefit in
the form of a gain in immunity to any individual, though there may be (3) a
noncomparative benefit, in the form of a high level of immunity, enjoyed by the
supra-person brought into existence by the enhancement, and (4) a gain ‘from the
eye of the universe’ in the form of the replacement of a less immune individual with
a more immune one. There may also, of course, be (5) straightforward economic,
social or scientific benefits (or indeed harms) to those who remain unenhanced due,
for example, to the greater productivity of the enhanced. It is unclear whether this
overall package of harms and benefits would be one that we have most reason to
encourage. Benefits (3) and (4) are arguably morally less weighty than harms (1)
and (2), since they do not consist in gains to fixed individuals, and it is not clear that
general economic, social and scientific benefits—(5)—could make up for this
difference.
Fortunately, for the proponent of human enhancement, it is very doubtful whether
status enhancements would have to be identity altering. It is true that existing
philosophical work on our identity tends to address the question ‘what is required
for personal identity?’ This question is naturally read as presupposing that we are
essentially persons; that we could not cease to be persons while remaining the same
individual. Moreover, some have explicitly defended the view that we are
essentially persons (Baker 1999, pp. 154–155, 2000, pp. 105–106). If this view is
correct, then identity could not be preserved across the transition from personhood
to supra-personhood. However, when philosophers hold that we are essentially
persons, what they presumably have in mind is that our identity could not be
preserved across the transition to sub-personhood; we could not remain the same
individual while losing that which makes us persons rather than sub-persons. It
seems doubtful whether those who hold this view would deny that identity could be
preserved across the transition from personhood to supra-personhood. Indeed,
though what follows is necessarily cursory, the dominant accounts of our identity
seem quite consistent with the view that a transition to supra-personhood could
leave our identities intact. On psychological accounts, identity is preserved when
there is psychological continuity, or there are overlapping periods of psychological
continuity, across time. Typically, the types of psychological continuity thought
relevant are certain kinds of cross-referencing of mental states to one another across
time, such as when a mental state at t1 figures in a memory at t2, or where a desire, at
t1, to have such-and-such mental state at t2 is indeed satisfied at t2. There is little
reason to suppose that cross-referencing of these sorts would be threatened by even
radical enhancements of mental capacity. The preservation of identity across the
transition from personhood to supra-personhood is even more assured on the
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dominant alternative account of our identity—the biological account. On this
account, our identity is preserved when we survive as organisms. If an enhancement
that would supposedly render us supra-persons were to operate via, say, a
pharmaceutical or genetic intervention, it would presumably rely on our continued
survival as organisms.
It seems plausible, then, that identity could be preserved across the transition
from personhood to supra-personhood. Of course, it might well be argued that
identity could be preserved, but not in such a way as to retain its ordinary
significance. Derek Parfit has argued that identity can be lost while what is
normatively significant in survival is preserved (1984, pp. 199–280). Arguably,
what is normatively significant in survival may also be lost while identity is
preserved (McMahan 2002, p. 51). So it is worth noting that, plausibly, everything
normatively significant in our survival would also be untouched by the transition to
supra-personhood. Again, this can be seen by considering the implications of the
dominant philosophical views. Accounts of what matters in survival tend to cite
psychological relations similar to those cited by psychological accounts of personal
identity: the cross-referencing of mental states. Status enhancements need not
threaten those relations. Some authors do suggest more stringent criteria for what
matters in survival. For example, some allow that a degree of persistence of one’s
beliefs, desires or mental dispositions across time may be part of what matters in
survival. Clearly, these mental states and dispositions might be altered by radical
enhancements of mental capacity (McMahan 2002, pp. 69–81, 316–322). Others
hold that for what matters in survival to be preserved across a psychological change,
one’s life narrative must be preserved; any psychological changes must be folded
into a single first-personal life story (Taylor 1989; Schechtman 1996; MacIntyre
1997; DeGrazia 2005). On this view, too, there is the potential for the transition to
supra-personhood to disrupt what matters in survival, say, if the necessary
enhancements were forced upon people, or were driven by inauthentic desires that
were foreign to their narratives. However even on these views, it seems possible that
what matters in survival could survive the transition to supra-personhood. We can
imagine someone pursuing a series of enhancements in a stepwise fashion based on
careful deliberation and in pursuit of a coherent project. She gradually acquires
greater and greater mental capacity, and eventually a supra-person emerges. In such
a case, there seems little reason to say that a life narrative has been disrupted, and
the changes wrought to her mental states and dispositions seem similar to, though
ultimately greater than, those brought about through intensive and prolonged
education, which is not normally thought to attenuate what matters in survival.
Whether we adopt a psychological or biological account of our identity, it seems
plausible that our identity could persist across the transition to supra-personhood.
More importantly, it also seems plausible that what matters in survival could survive
the transition. If both of these thoughts are correct, then there is no harm through
going out of existence to the individual who undergoes the enhancement. Indeed,
that individual benefits through acquiring greater immunity in the same straight-
forward way that unenhanced individuals are harmed through losing immunity.
There is no justification for downgrading the benefits relative to the harms by
appealing to considerations of identity or what matters in survival.
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Of course, we might still downgrade the benefits because we take benefits to be,
quite generally, less morally weighty than harms. But as we have seen, it is unclear
whether this difference in weight is sufficient to establish that we have most reason
not to encourage status enhancements.
6 Conclusion
One objection to the technological enhancement of humans mental capacities holds
that
(1) It may result in the creation of supra-persons.
(2) The creation of supra-persons would harm ordinary, unenhanced humans.
(3) We have moral reasons not to encourage certain human enhancements: those
that would create supra-persons.
Allen Buchanan responds to this objection by questioning (1) and (2), but I have
argued that these claims are difficult to undermine. I have argued, contra Buchanan,
that (1) and (2) could be true even if we reject the view that moral status constantly
rises with mental capacity, and even if we allow that persons are inviolable.
Moreover, I conceded that (1) and (2) do provide some support to (3).
Nevertheless, the proponent of human enhancement may be able to respond
adequately to this objection. The acquisition of supra-personal moral status by some
could harm unenhanced humans by reducing their immunity to permissible harm,
and this may give us some reason not to encourage status enhancements. But it is
not clear that this reason is decisive and I have argued that four attempts to show
that it is fail. First, though status enhancements would redistribute immunity to
permissible harm in the direction of greater inequality in immunity, this inequality
need not be disvaluable. Second, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that we
might, in our stance towards status enhancements, be partial to the unenhanced, and
against the enhanced. Moreover, even if we could make sense of this idea, it is
difficult to see why we ought to be partial. Third, though harms may be morally
weightier than benefits, so that the losses in immunity caused by status enhancement
matter more than the corresponding gains in immunity, it is not clear that this
difference in moral importance would be sufficient to outweigh other benefits that
human enhancements capable of elevating moral status might have. And fourth, it is
plausible that status enhancements need alter neither identity nor what is
normatively significant in survival, and if they would not, the gains in immunity
that they produce count as benefits to individuals in the same straightforward way
that the losses count as harms.
I have assumed throughout that supra-persons would be created through the
enhancement of pre-existing persons. If they came about in some other way, for
example, through the enhancement of early embryos that do not yet qualify as
persons, then some of my arguments would not hold. In that case, there would be no
persons who would benefit from becoming supra-persons, though there are others
who would be harmed. This would leave room for one to oppose status
enhancements on the basis that resulting changes in immunity would harm some
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persons without benefitting others. Whether this argument succeeds would depend
on the relative importance of person-affecting and other moral considerations, on
how bad it is for a person to lose immunity to permissible harm, and on the scale of
any scientific, social or economic benefits of status enhancements to those who
remain unenhanced.
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